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Abstract:
In this essay I want to extend the brief discussion of "higher-order" conditions presented in
Reconstructing Argumentative Discourse (Van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jackson, and Jacobs,
1993). After a brief discussion of the scope and function of higher-order conditions, I will examine
the modes of subjectivity entailed in their description of the ideal arguer. I will then move to a
discussion of the relationship between governance and rationality underwriting their description of
the socio-political environment conducive to critical discussion. I will conclude the essay with
remarks on the role of procedural theories of argumentation in a deliberative conception of
democracy.
***
I
Disagreement is an enduring feature of a democratic society and an interminable element of its political
institutions. There is no set of moral, religious, political and philosophical commitments that all, or even most,
persons hold. Society is, instead, constituted by a plurality of conflicting and perhaps irreconcilable doctrines.
Moreover, there is no universal standard by which to rule some of these doctrines as false or unreasonable.
Thus, our public lives are marked by the "conflict over the terms defining our practical and passionate relations to
one another and over all the resources and assumptions that may influence these terms" (Unger, 1987, 10).
Given the "fact" of democratic pluralism, it is difficult, if not impossible, to judge the veracity of claims on
substantive grounds. That is, there is no neutral way to determine if one set of "good reasons" is preferable to
another. Any judgment based on the merits of the case will imply an endorsement of the values and ideological
commitments implied in the advocate's position. While this is may not be a problem in our political lives it does
present a challenge to a theory of argumentation. A theory of argument should be able to set out objective
standards for judging argumentative practice. A theory of argumentation committed to the principles of
democratic pluralism while rejecting epistemological and moral relativism must be founded on a set of principles
that warrant the assent of any reasonable person independently of his or her moral, religious, political, and
philosophical commitments. Hence, a fundamental challenge for a theory of argument is to discover or invent a
set of normative principles to evaluate argumentation while respecting the fact that people will contest the norms
of political and social conduct.
Procedural theories of argument locate these normative principles in the "rightness" of the procedures regulating
critical discussion. The "procedural goal-oriented standards for the conduct of discussion" constitute the standard
of reasonableness that guide the description, reconstruction and evaluation of argumentative practice (van
Eemeren et. al., 1993). This "dialectical" perspective differs from "logical" perspectives that locate normative
standards in the form of argument. It also differs from "rhetorical" perspectives that view the "good reasons" put

forth by advocates as constitutive of a community's practices and traditions. (Wenzel, 1990).
The "rightness" of procedures cannot be derived from an anthropological description of the methods people use
to pursue and settle disputes. While anthropological studies of disputes have much to teach about how we
engage in arguments, procedural theories of argument are not concerned with how we merely settle our
differences but in discovering and inventing procedures that "enable discussants to really resolve disputes on the
merits" of the argumentation put forth by the parties themselves (Van Eemeren et. al., 1993).
Procedures are assigned a special moral status. Following the procedure itself is a good that is morally
compelling above and beyond the consequences of its use. This does not imply that the effects of the procedures
are irrelevant. Rather, the normative force of procedures does not come from their effects but from the fact that
they reflect basic moral duties and capacities that parties are to respect and perform.
The moral status and regulatory force of the procedures governing argumentation must be agreed upon by all
parties. If they are not we risk replicating the coercion of imposing a single conception of the good upon persons
separated by real differences of thought and belief. Consensus over the reasonableness of procedures is derived
from the presuppositions embedded in communication oriented to reaching understanding and resolving
differences of opinion. Pragma-dialectical theories of argument operationalize the grounds of this consensus in
terms of problem-solving and intersubjective validity. Problem-solving validity refers to the efficacy of the
procedure to resolve disagreements while avoiding obstacles and false resolutions (van Eemeren et. al., 1993).
Intersubjective validity concerns the "conformity between the procedures components and the values, standards,
and objectives actual arguers find acceptable" (14).
By grounding the validity of procedural designs in their ability to generate authentic resolutions and their
conformity to the values and standards embedded in practices of actual audiences pragma-dialectical theories
can provide critical normative grounds for critiquing argumentative practices that avoid the problems of
objectivism and relativism. A procedural theory of argument is not objectivist because its procedures are
founded in argumentative practice. It is not relativistic because it does not simply ground reasonableness in the
patterns of behavior a particular community uses to settle disputes. The reasonableness of procedural designs is
based on the practices that a "rational" person employs when he or she is "truly" oriented to understanding and
resolving a difference of opinion. A procedural theory of argument, thus, allows for the background assumptions,
decision-making practices and prejudices of a particular community to be the object of scrutiny.
Procedural models of argument set out the rules and conditions of critical discussion in terms of a code of
conduct that stipulates legitimate argumentative roles and moves. This code of conduct regulates: (1) Who can
speak; procedural models posit the competencies and dispositions that participants have to possess in order to
be recognized as rationally and seriously participating in critical discussion. (2) How participants should phrase
their utterances at different stages of argumentation; procedural models set out the distribution of speech acts that
persons must use in order to be heard as complying with the rules of critical discussion. And, (3) What forms of
discourse are established as authentic, irrational, taboo and true; procedural models stipulate the argumentation
schemes that will be heard as valid and the argumentative status of expressions of personal feelings and intuitions.
Codes of conduct, especially as expressed by pragma-dialectical theories, are prohibitive in character. They are
more precise in setting out which speech acts are unsuitable to resolution than what speech acts constitute "good"
arguments. For instance, strategies that end discussion without mutual consent and any statement of commitments
that are based in the advocates personal stake in the outcome of the dispute are prohibited in a normative model
of critical discussion.

Political and legal theorists cite three distinct advantages of procedural models of dispute resolution. First,
procedures are an effective means of obtaining just decisions. The norms underwriting a procedural theory of
argument include: (a) An openness to the views of all persons possibly affected by the results of a substantive
decision; (b) A focus on factual information subjected to expert and critical scrutiny; And (c) A rigorous process
of public debate where all of the possible pros and cons of substantive decisions are thoroughly discussed.
Second, shared procedures are the means by which an interconnected institutional system works most
effectively. Shared procedures define the particular roles of institutions and their relations to each other. They
also set up a mechanism of checks and balances for systemic self-correction. Third, shared procedures preserve
faith in the competence of political institutions. A decision reached in accordance with duly established
procedures is granted some degree of legitimacy in spite of whether it is correct or not. One may contest the
prudence or popular support of a substantive decision. However, if the decision was the result of the use of duly
established procedures it is binding until and unless those procedures are revised.
It seems that a procedural theory of argument offers a satisfactory answer to the demands of democratic
pluralism, for both making legitimate political decisions and constructing a critical normative standard to judge
argumentative practice. However, proceduralism is not without its detractors. The dichotomy presupposed in
these theories between procedure and substance is viewed with suspicion. Rules and principles, it is argued, can
not in themselves generate critically-rational argumentative discussions (Wenzel, 1990). Procedural theories of
argument assume that arguers can and will bring the appropriate knowledge and attitudes to the table with them.
Moreover, procedural theories assume the existence of socio-political conditions conducive to resolving disputes
through critical discussion. Without an account of the arguer and the environment necessary for resolution a
procedural theory of argument remains incomplete. In response, pragma-dialectical theory posits the necessity of
a set of "higher-order" conditions which set out the psychological makeup of the arguer and the socio-political
conditions necessary for conducting critical discussion.
I am particularly interested in the model arguer set out in these higher-order conditions. What are the moral and
intellectual comportment's attributed to the person engaging in argumentation? How do individuals acquire the
psychological capacities and dispositions required of them to be considered rational discussants? These are
difficult questions that cannot be fully answered in this short essay. To begin focusing my reflection, I review a
particular objection to the conception of the arguer set out in procedural theories of argument—namely that this
conception of the arguer is underwritten by an untenable model of the person. I then briefly work through some
ways that this objection can be answered by invoking a particular reading of the second-order conditions
presupposed in critical discussion—namely that procedures constitute the substantive identity of the arguer and
that this "autonomous self" is not too thin to engage in critical discussion. I think working through this objection
and one possible answer gives some insight to the power and limits of the discussion of higher-order conditions in
van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jackson, and Jacobs (1993).

II
One objection to procedural theories of argument is that they rest on an untenable conception of the person. The
thrust of this objection is that proceduralism is based on a "thin" notion of the self, a self that is not constituted by
her or his engagement in communities of meaning but only by her or his ability to engage in argumentation. This
"thin" conception of the self does not adequately describe the motivations, values, and commitments persons
bring with them into argumentation. This conception of the self is too empty and abstract to provide adequate

grounds for a normative model.
This objection begins by pointing out that if a procedural model of argumentation is committed to remain neutral
towards competing conceptions of the good, it must require that participants in critical discussions set aside their
private identity and adopt an idealized identity for the sake of critical discussion. As Robert Maier (1995) claims,
this move is suspicious because by describing the arguer as having to strip away her or his motives, attitudes,
social position and affective investments, procedural theories resolve the problem of difference by stipulation
rather than explanation and argument. Needless to say, this constitutes somewhat of a performative
contradiction.
This idealized identity fits with what Michael Sandel (1984) has called the "unencumbered self." The
"unencumbered self" refers to an image of the person that is independent of and prior to purposes and ends. This
is a self that has no communal ties and no commitments to a conception of the good. This image of the self is
rooted in the Enlightenment promise of a sovereign human subject free from the dictates of nature, society, and
God. As participants in a pure procedural scheme of argumentation, "we are free to construct principles of
justice unconstrained by an order of value antecedently given" (Sandel, 1984, 87). Thus, as long as our
conceptions of the good and the policies they authorize do not unjustly limit the freedom of others, they are
afforded legitimacy simply by virtue of having been chosen through the process of argumentation.
As attractive as this promise seems it is an unrealistic image of the person. The person that I am cannot be
separated from the values that I hold. The unencumbered self is without character and moral depth. The idealized
self underwriting procedural theories of argument is denied the
possibility of membership in any community where the self itself could be at stake. Such a
community—call it constitutive as against merely cooperative—would engage the identity as well as
the interests of the participants, and so implicate its members in a citizenship more thoroughgoing
than the unencumbered self can know (Sandel, 1984, 87).
Procedural theories, according to Sandel, in their attempt to construct neutral models of dispute resolution may
have thrown out the baby with the bathwater. While grounding their normative standards on an image of a person
who can bracket out her or his private interests and fully commit to the demands of a procedure designed to
fairly resolve differences of opinion, procedural theories have stipulated an image of the person who may not
possess thick enough commitments and loyalties to have a standpoint she or he would want to defend in
argumentation.
If this objection is sustained, the moral status of procedures cannot be derived independently of the substantive
values that constitute the identities of those engaging in argumentation. The procedure/substance dichotomy is
deconstructed and the hope of finding a set of normative principles for evaluating argumentative practice that
does not rest upon a prior commitment to a conception of the good is unwarranted. A theory of argument would
have to limit its scope to the community’s whose values it took into account as the foundation for its normative
principles. As Richard Rorty (1989) has observed a theory of argument founded in the practices and values of a
particular community would have to content itself with being frankly ethnocentric.
An answer to this objection consists of two responses. First we can begin by granting that procedure and
substance cannot be radically separated. Rather, procedures are constitutive of substantive commitments and
vice versa. Critics of proceduralism make the mistake of thinking that our commitments and loyalties—which
make us full persons—are derived independently of the methods of deliberating and choosing together what

conceptions of the good should prevail for the moment. The second part of our answer points to the fact that this
objection does not take into account the commitments, attitudes, and dispositions of the arguer described in
procedural theories. That is, the persona of the arguer described in procedural theories is not "unencumbered"
and "thin" but to the contrary is "situated" and "thick."
No procedural design will work if the parties do not have a discussion-minded attitude. Persons engaged in
argumentation must be willing and able to "express their opinions, listen to the opinions of others, and to change
their own opinions when these fail to survive critical examination" (van Eemeren, et. al., 1993). Van Eemeren, et.
al. (1993) describe the motivations, competencies, and intentions constituting this discussion-minded attitude as
second-order conditions of critical discussion. Second-order conditions refer to the presupposition of a rational
arguer and audience who
appeal to reasoning and evidence acceptable to themselves and to the other party, adjusting to their
interlocutor's frame of reference and establishing a common ground or identification of interests
from which they might reason together or otherwise transcend their divisions. They would be
expected to conduct themselves in ways that maintain a mutual openness to criticism and to the
demand for justification. (142)
If interlocutors fail to satisfy these conditions they can be held accountable for not doing so and sanctioned for
failing to "live up to standards of rational conduct" (143).
Procedural theories do not simply assume that arguers possess the ability and desire to conduct themselves in a
rational manner, they contend that the experience of participating in critical discussion may produce individuals
with more critical-rational and democratic dispositions—individuals who are more tolerant, better able to
examine their preferences, more willing to take the claims of others seriously, and more prepared to submit their
judgments to the test of critical scrutiny. Mark Warren (1992) has referred to the claim that participation in
deliberation produces selves who are more developed, autonomous and self-governing and thus are better able
to meet the demands of deliberation as the self-transformation thesis. One implication of the self-transformation
thesis, that is especially relevant to answering the charge that procedural theories rest upon an unencumbered
self, is that the interests and capacities that define the self are not wholly determined prior to participating in
deliberation. As Bowles and Gintis (1986) put it the interests and preferences defining the person "are as much
formed as revealed in the exercise of choice. Individuals choose in order to become, and the nature of
opportunities given for the expression of choice affects the formation of the will" (138). The self is in large part
formed in and through argumentation. The formation of self-identity is, therefore, dependent on the discursive
organization of political institutions and the constraints and possibilities of dissent those structures allow (this is
where third-order conditions would come into play). Claims that procedural models strip the self of any
substance miss this point.
Participation in argumentation has a unique capacity to foster and develop an autonomous self. Autonomy
describes a critical faculty of judgment: individuals are autonomous inasmuch as their preferences, goals and life
projects are the result of critical reflection and searching dialogue and debate rather than manipulation,
brainwashing, an unreflective acceptance of traditional social roles, and blind obedience to tradition. Autonomy
does not imply that our preferences and goals should not be taken from our traditions and social roles but that
that these sources of self-identity should be chosen as the result of the free exercise of practical reason. In its
thicker sense autonomy involves the selections of ends following a process of reflection, deliberation, scrutiny
and consideration. Autonomy includes the ability to detach oneself from one's circumstances while realizing that

one is fully constituted by those circumstances.
The dispositions and abilities of the autonomous self include courage, loyalty, independence, tolerance, a strong
work ethic, adaptability, respect, the ability to make critical evaluations, the willingness to listen to other points of
view, and the ability express dissent in a civil manner. Put in terms of argumentative competencies and
dispositions the autonomous self is expected to "reason validly, to take into account multiple lines of argument, to
integrate coordinate sets of arguments, and to balance competing directions of argumentation" (van Eemeren, et.
al., 1993, 32). Moreover, arguers ought to be disinterested in the outcome of discussion. That is, they must be
willing to risk having to abandon their beliefs if they cannot defend them in argumentation.
Critics like Sandel (1984) and Maier (1995) mistakenly see procedural theories as only endorsing a thin sense of
autonomy. They fail to understand that autonomy can also entail a set of commitments that are as substantive as
any of our other communal identities. Perhaps the "thickest" of our identities is our membership in a community of
religious faith; at least it is the favorite example of communitarians like Sandel. If we can show that the
motivations and dispositions entailed in autonomy are as thick of a set of commitments as religious belief, we
could safely assume that the argumentative self is sufficiently situated to engage in robust deliberations designed
to resolve differences of opinion. The importance of autonomy in constituting religious identities is easy to see if
we consider the progressive movement in the Catholic church. Progressives hold that Catholicism should engage
the modern world and appropriate the values and beliefs of that world if they are demonstrated to be morally
sound and intellectually valid. Progressive Catholics, therefore, usually, though not always, support married
priests, female priests, the democratization of church authority, the downgrading of papal authority, greater
tolerance for theological dissent, a repeal of the ban of contraceptives, and a flexible moral code in reference to
abortion and homosexuality. I think the reason that progressive Catholics support these policies is because they
use the norms of democracy, tolerance, and a willingness to test ideas in debate and discussion entailed by
autonomy to judge the practices and doctrines of the church. In short, progressive Catholics fully integrate the
characteristics of autonomy with their religious faith and they expect the church to do the same. It seems, at least
in this case, that autonomy is every bit as influential as faith in constructing self-identity. Thus, it seems reasonable
to conclude that autonomy is itself a constitutive end through which we can build a fully situated and communal
identity.
If we interpret the attitudes and dispositions of the arguer, described in the second-order conditions posited by
van Eemeren, et. al., as constituting the normative ideal of autonomy and contend that autonomy is not only a
precondition for but an effect of engaging in argument, we can use these second-order conditions as a strategy
for answering the charge that procedural theories rest on an untenable conception of the person. However, I do
think Maier (1995) has a point when he claims that pragma-dialecticians tend to answer objections by stipulation
rather than argument. The existence of a psychologically mature and critically-rational arguer and a socio-political
environment free of massive social constraints is presupposed rather than accounted for. Yet, autonomy is not a
natural attribute but an "inherently social capacity that individuals develop through their interactions with others,
by coming to know others as both separate human beings with their own unique capacities, problems and
interests and as beings with whom one shares at least some experiences, problems and interests" (Warren, 1992,
12). Autonomy is a normative ideal that should not be merely stipulated as a second-order logical presupposition
or empirical precondition of argumentation. Autonomy is a higher-order condition of argumentation but it is not a
characteristic of an uncaused, unencumbered self. Rather autonomy is a social accomplishment; an
accomplishment that is the product of a great deal of discipline and governance, an accomplishment that is
amenable to empirical description.

In his critical survey of the development of psychology, Nikolas Rose (1996) argues that "to live as an
autonomous individual, you must learn new techniques for understanding and practicing upon yourself. Freedom,
that is to say, is enacted only at the price of relying on experts of the soul" (17). Argumentation theorists,
inasmuch as we teach people how to live as autonomous individuals by engaging in critical discussions, surely are
one set of experts of the soul. The practical task of argumentation theory is to "transform individual arguers into
ideal critical discussants by equipping them with skills and encouraging attitudes required for ideal participation"
(van Eemeren, et. al., 1993, 178). Argumentation theory, then, is not just a body of thought but a model for a
certain form of life, a mode of acting in the world. That is, argumentation theory is a form of cultural policy and
political education that both presupposes the existence of and provides the disciplinary techniques for producing
self-reflective, critically-minded citizens capable of both cooperation and dissent. This is nothing to be ashamed
of. But it does present a challenge to critically describe the production of those norms governing the production
of the arguer as an autonomous agent rather than stipulating her or his existence. The figure of the arguer plays a
major part in procedural theories of argument. Yet, there is little focus on the concrete persona of the arguer
inculcated in and through argumentative practice. Surely a plausible account of the arguer requires that we pay
attention to how the specific capacities and attributes possessed by arguers are formed and acquired in the
course of their participation in critical discussion.
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